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Abstract
The connection between age and productivity is a widely discussed
topic in the empirical literature. The present paper’s aim is to contribute
to the explanation of an apparant lower productivity of older individuals.
If we introduce uncertainty about the future working conditions depending
on present success, a decrease of productivity over the working life can be
observed despite a constant a priori productivity.
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1 Introduction
Especially European countries are characterized by two aspects changing the
age structure and the size of the population at the same time. Improvements in
health care and several other reasons increase the life expectancy. Additionally,
the fertility decreases. This has or may have severe consequences in all areas of
life. Obviously, the pension system faces new challenges. The median voter is
older. Structure and size of the health care system have to change. The demand
structure in a society will adapt. And even environmental consequences can be
expected.1
Theoretically, there are several impacts of an aging population on produc-
tivity. First, we have a direct impact due to influence of the population size on
the number of workers and on the capital intensity in production. Second, we
have two indirect eﬀects. A longer life enforces a higher saving rate in younger
years. But an older average household leads to a relatively decreased share of
income spent for saving purposes.
If we concentrate on the labor market we have to state that European pension
systems are in most cases organized as pay-as-you-go systems. This type of
system is stressed usually by several factors. First, the number of pensioners
increases directly as a consequence of the demographic changes mentioned above
and as a result of regulating the labor market with the instrument of early
retirement. This leads to a rejuvenation of the employees.2 A problem arises:
To stabilize the pension systems it is necessary to increase the age of retirement.
But at the same time, older workers are discriminated in the labor market
(Büsch, 2004).3
Two questions arise in this context. First: Can unjustifiable discrimination
be explained? The main arguments follow two lines. The first was introduced
by Becker (1957). Becker argues that persons prefer to deal with individuals of
their own group defined by age, sex or race. Several commentaries have to be
made concerning this theory. Firstly, this model can not explain discrimination
itself. Secondly, in competitive markets discrimination should vanish in the long
run. Thirdly, although this contradicts standard assumption of economic theory
it is compatible with models of bounded rationality or transaction costs. The
other line of arguments is associated with the model of statistical discrimination
introduced by Aigner and Cain (1977).4 If we assume limited information on
1See Ono and Maeda (2001) for the last argument. Here, the impact depends on the risk
aversion. If the risk aversion is small enough, aging increases the environmental quality.
2 In Germany, retirement with 60 years of age after unemployment was possible until 1992.
As a consequence, the retirement age decreased in OECD countries from 65 in 1965 to below
60 in 1995. At the same time we observe unemployment rates in the age group between
55 and 64 above average in Germany, whereas in the EU15, EU19 or in the OECD countries
unemployment rates in this age group are always below the average. See Blöndal and Scarpetta
(1999) and OECD (2008).
3We have to emphasize that the notion ‘old’ is not clearly defined. Tuckman and Lorge
(1952) see a worker older than 45 as old, whereas Arrowsmith and McGoldrick (1996) would
set the point at the age of 40 and Lee and Clemens (1985) at the age of 61. Büsch (2004)
examines the intervall between 27 and 53 and finds clear evidence for age discrimination.
4Arrow (1972, 1974), Phelps (1972) and Spence (1973) provided fundamentals for this
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the real productivity of workers caused by diﬃculties in the measurement of
productivity, then it could be rational to use group specific characteristics as
a device. The unobservable individual attribute is replaced by the observable
group-specific parameter value. Consequently, age discrimination is possible
if it is assumed that the older worker has lower productivity. Additionally,
measurement costs and variabilities can be diﬀerent. Consequently, older worker
can be discriminated if the test or the used attribute associate them on average
with lower productivity. Again, the argument is not very convincing. This leads
directly to the second question.
The second question is: Is discrimination justifiable since we have real dif-
ferences in the productivity between age groups? It is a widespread stereotype
that older worker are probably less productive. The arguments given in the lit-
erature are that the physical abilities decrease in general, cognitive abilities at
least in some areas. Nevertheless, empirical evidence for age-dependent individ-
ual productivity is not unambiguous.5 Skirbekk (2004) states that individual
productivity starts to decrease with the age of 50. In a few cases, the em-
pirical evidence that supports the so-called deficit model is derived using an
investigation of the productivity or creativity in special fields. Since there is
a certain agreement about decreasing physical abilities it is of interest to learn
more about the change in areas where these characteristics are playing a minor
role. Therefore, investigations are usually done in fields like arts and sciences.
In general, Bayer and Dutton (1977) as well as Bratsberg et al. (2003) support
this hypothesis. Levin and Stephan (1989, 1991) find a decline of creativity
after investigating the fields of physics, earth sciences, physiology and biochem-
istry. Over (1982), observing the careers of psychologists, comes to the same
conclusion. Weinberg and Galenson (2005) observe a decline of creativity after
investigating the careers of Nobel laureates in economics. Oster and Hamer-
mesh (1998) also chose their own colleagues as guinea pigs. Miller (1999) found
a decline of creativity after following the careers of famous painters, musicians
and writers - with the exception of female writers! In principle, the same result
is derived by Kanazawa (2003), who also adds criminals to his sample. Korniotis
and Kumar (2007) support the hypotheses after a look at the productivity of
investment bankers.
In the following we want to argue that some of these results can be explained
by the selection process inside the community of these groups.
2 The Model
The aim of this paper is to investigate the predication of a decrease of indi-
vidual productivity during the professional life. We assume scientists work for
three periods. Having in mind that the professional education of scientists (and
other highly specialized persons) usually takes a bit more time this corresponds
to approximately three decades of professional life. In the following we denote
argument.
5 See Börsch-Supan, Düzgün and Weiss (2005) for a discussion.
3
the decades with I, II and III for the first, second and third decade in the
professional life of a cohort, respectively.6 The productivity of a person within
a decade is assumed to be constant. Two diﬀerent productivity levels are pos-
sible. In general the persons have an average productivity l. But depending
on individual characteristics the persons can reach an outstanding level of cre-
ativity h.7 Persons of type α remain on this level for the whole professional
life. Persons of type β1 reach this level in the first two decades and have an
average productivity in the third decade, whereas persons of type β2 start their
professional life with average productivity and are characterized by high pro-
ductivity in the decades II and III. And finally, persons of type γ1, γ2 and γ3
have an above-average productivity h only in the decades I, II and III, respec-
tively. One could add a person of type δ with average productivity of his or her
complete professsional life. But for simplicity we exclude this group completely
since we entirely concentrate our interest on outstanding contributions in one’s
field that are also in the center of the empirical studies cited above.8
decade
type I II III
α h h h
β1 h h l
β2 l h h
γ1 h l l
γ2 l h l
γ3 l l h
A first look on the table suggests a peak of productivity in the second decade
if we assume an equal size of each group consisting of individuals of types α,
β and γ, respectively (N (α) = N (β) = N (γ) = N3 ).
9 This result does not
change if the group size varies between types α, β and γ. The peak remains in
the second decade if there are more or less individuals of type β than of type
α. The same is true for all possible frequencies of occurrence of the basic types
α, β and γ. But obviously the result changes if we have diﬀerent frequencies of
types β1, β2, γ1, γ2 and γ3. A distribution of abilities N (β1) > N (β2) and/or
N (γ1) > N (γ3) corresponds to a decreasing productivity with age inside a
cohort. Particularly, with the given notation we can write this condition as:
N (β1)
N (β)
+
N (γ1)
N (γ)
>
N (β3)
N (β)
+
N (γ3)
N (γ)
If we exclude a significantly mortality risk during the working age we have
to find other explanations. One reason may be the dependence of the group
6The first decade captures the age between 30 and 40, the second decade the years between
40 and 50 and the third decade the years after the 50th birthday. If the person is 60 years old
he or she retires.
7Throughout the paper we assume a constant size of the population and of each group.
8 In the following section we normalize h = 1 and a = 0.
9 If an individual of type β1 loses its high abilities with 45 years of age and if individuals
of type β2 become more productive following their 45th birthday we have a constant average
productivity of each cohort.
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Figure 1: Probabilities and the change of the status of individuals.
aﬃliation at a certain point of time on the group aﬃliation in a previous point
of time. If we assume that the belonging to a group is not exogenous but depends
on endogenous variables, we have another possible explanation for decreasing
average productivity over the life cycle.
For simplicity we assume that the ability to create an outstanding piece of
work depends not only on individual characteristics but also on some "capital".
This can be a laboratory that had to be used, a grant that is received or even
the possibility to exchange ideas within the community we look at. In that case
we observe a decreasing productivity in all cases where this capital is available
mainly at the beginning of a career. Up to now the probability to have a
smashing idea for a person of type α within a certain period was equal to one.
Now let us assume this is reduced tom, if the person belongs to a community, or
to n, if the person is an outsider, with 1 > m > n > 0. Furthermore let us add
a selection mechanism. If the person was successful in period t, the probability
to stay an insider is z. Without success, this probability is v. In order to make
sense we have to postulate z > v. Figure (1) illustrates the change of the status
of individuals.
If we assume that all persons of interest have completed their studies suc-
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cessfully we can start at a point at which z · N (•) of each type of individuals
are members of the scientific community. To simplify the notation in what fol-
lows we use capital letters for the number of individuals in each group with a
superscript for the period and an asterisk for the number of the insiders.
2.1 "Forever Young" - Individuals of Life-long High Pro-
ductivity
If we take up the cliché persons that are productive on a high level for their
whole lifetime can be called "forever young".10 The individuals of the α-type
inside the community will have success with a probability of m and can stay
inside the community with a probability z. The same calculation can be made
for all combinations of possibilities, ending with the number of individuals in
each group at the beginning of the second decade being:
AII∗ = [z · (m · z + (1−m) · v) + (1− z) · (n · z + (1− n) · v)] ·A (1)
AII =
∙
z · (m · (1− z) + (1−m) · (1− v))
+ (1− z) · (n · (1− z) + (1− n) · (1− v))
¸
·A (2)
If we assume that each individual makes one contribution per decade, we have
an output of m · AI∗ + n · AI = [m · z + n · (1− z)] · A contributions from this
group in this decade. We now want to calculate the output and the distribution
of individuals in the second decade. At the beginning of the third decade there
are the following groups of individuals of type α:
AIII∗ = [m · z + (1−m) · v] ·AII∗ + [n · z + (1− n) · v] ·AII (3)
AIII = [m · (1− z) + (1−m) · (1− v)] ·AII∗ (4)
+ [n · (1− z) + (1− n) · (1− v)] ·AII
Output in the second and third decades is consequently:
m ·AII∗+ n ·AII =
⎡
⎣
m2 · z2 + ¡m · v + n2 · (1− v)¢ · z · (1−m)
+
∙ ¡
m · v + n2 · (1− v)¢ · (1− n)
+ (2 ·m · z + n · (1− z)) · n
¸
· (1− z)
⎤
⎦ ·A (5)
m ·AIII∗+n ·AIII =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−n3 · (v − z)2 · (z − 1)
+m ·
µ
m2 · z3 +m · v2 · (m · z − 1)
+v · ¡m · z − 2 ·m2 · z2 + 1¢
¶
+n2 · (v − z) ·
µ
m · z · (2− 3 · z)
+v · (m · (3 · z − 2)− 1) + 1
¶
+n ·
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 +m · z +m · v2 · (m− 3 ·m · z + 2)
+m2 · ¡z2 − 3 · z3¢
+v ·
µ
2 ·m2 · z · (3 · z − 1)
−m · (2 · z + 1)− 1
¶
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
·A
(6)
10Here, we refer to Bob Dylan as an outstanding example for this group.
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To find conditions for a decreasing output we can calculate
¡
m ·AI∗ + n ·AI¢−¡
m ·AII∗ + n ·AII¢ > 0. This leads to:
0 <
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
[m−m · (m · z + v · (1−m))] · z
+
∙
n−
µ
m · (n · z + v · (1− n))
+m · n · z + n2 · (1− z)
¶¸
· (1− z)
− [z · (1−m) + (1− n) · (1− z)] · n · (1− v)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ·A
= (m− n) · (v − z) · ((m− n) · z + n− 1) ·A = ΩA1 ·A (7)
ΩA1 > 0 ⇔ m · z < n · (1− z)
Obviously, a simple statement about the behavior of the system is not possi-
ble. Here, it would be interesting to know more about the output of this group
over time. In principle, the group remains on the same productivity level in all
three periods. Nevertheless, a short inspection of this expression reveals that a
decreasing output is possible. We consider first a point with m = z = 1. Irre-
spective of the values of n and v this implies a certain success of the individuals
in their eﬀort if they are insiders and there is no uncertainty with respect to
their status.11 Evaluating the right-hand side of the expression above produces
a zero; that implies a constant output.
∂ΩA1
∂m
= (v − z) · [2 · z · (m− n) + n− 1]
∂ΩA1
∂m
¯¯¯¯
m=z=1
= (1− n) · (v − 1) ≤ 0
∂ΩA1
∂n
= (v − z) · [(1− 2 · z) · (m− n)− n+ 1]
∂ΩA1
∂n
¯¯¯¯
m=z=1
= 0
∂ΩA1
∂v
= (m− n) · (z · (m− n) + n− 1)
∂ΩA1
∂v
¯¯¯¯
m=z=1
= 0
∂ΩA1
∂z
= (m− n)2 · (v − 2 · z)− (m− n) · (n− 1)
∂ΩA1
∂z
¯¯¯¯
m=z=1
= (1− n) · [v + n · (1− v)− 1] ≤ 0
A small deviation from the point m = z = 1 results therefore in a decreasing
output. If m, z < 1 then a change of n and v results in a decreasing output if:
0 > [(m− n)− 2 · z · (m− n)− n+ 1]
n >
1− z ·m
1− z
11 See equations (1) and (2).
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But the first inequality is impossible given that m > n and n < 1. The second
inequality is impossible as well since it would require values of n exceeding
1. Therefore, increasing values of n or v result in a rise of productivity and
compensate partially the negative impact of decreasing values of m and z.
If we compare the second and third decade the output decreases furthermore.
Here, the corresponding condition is
¡
m ·AII∗ + n ·AII¢−¡m ·AIII∗ + n ·AIII¢ >
0. Similar to (7) we get:
ΩA2 = − (m− n) 2 · (v − z) 2 · ((m− n) · z + n− 1) (8)
ΩA2 > 0 ⇔ m · z < n · (1− z)
Again we can start in a point with m = z = 1 and analyze the behavior of the
system:
∂ΩA2
∂m
= − (v − z) 2 · (m− n) · [3 · (m− n) · z + 2 · n− 2]
∂ΩA2
∂m
¯¯¯¯
m=z=1
= − (v − 1) 2 · (1− n) 2 ≤ 0
∂ΩA2
∂n
= − (v − z) 2 · (m− n) · [(m− n) · (1− 3 · z)− 2 · n+ 2]
∂ΩA2
∂n
¯¯¯¯
m=z=1
= 0
∂ΩA2
∂v
= −2 · (m− n) 2 · (v − z) · ((m− n) · z + n− 1)
∂ΩA2
∂v
¯¯¯¯
m=z=1
= 0
∂ΩA2
∂z
= − (m− n) 3 · (v − z) 2
+2 · (m− n) 2 · (v − z) · ((m− n) · z + n− 1)
∂ΩA2
∂z
¯¯¯¯
m=z=1
= − (1− n) 3 · (v − 1) 2 ≤ 0
Consequently, we can apply the same arguments as we did in the the comparison
of the output in the first and second decade: A small deviation from the point
m = z = 1 results in a decreasing output. Increasing values of n or v result in a
rise of productivity and compensate partially the negative impact of decreasing
values of m and z.
2.2 "Mid-life Crisis" - Changing Productivity Level in the
Second Decade
Now we look at the individuals of the β-type. Here we have to distinguish
between two subgroups. The first is highly productive in the first and second
decades, the second in the second and third decades. Although both groups
have two productive periods during their working life we will see immediately
8
that there is a mayor diﬀerence between them. We assume that the probabilities
are equal to values used in the previous section.
The subgroup of inviduals of type β1 starts with high a productivity. Con-
sequently, a share of z will start as an insider in the first period. The results in
the first and second decade are similar to those of the α-group. However, they
are unproductive in the last period. The subgroup of inviduals of type β2 has
a low productivity in the first period. Nevertheless, a share v becomes insider
even in the first decade. Insiders and outsiders are now indistinguishable from
α-individuals and have the same probabilities for success and continuance in the
group.
Subgroup B1 can be described as follows: The output in the first periods is
equal to m · BI∗1 + n · BI1 = [m · z + n · (1− z)] · B1. In the second and third
period, the distribution of individuals is given by:
BII∗1 = [z · (m · z + (1−m) · v) + (1− z) · (n · z + (1− n) · v)] ·B1 (9)
BII1 =
∙
z · (m · (1− z) + (1−m) · (1− v))
+ (1− z) · (n · (1− z) + (1− n) · (1− v))
¸
·B1 (10)
BIII∗1 = [m · z + (1−m) · v] ·BII∗1 + [n · z + (1− n) · v] ·BII1 (11)
BIII1 = [m · (1− z) + (1−m) · (1− v)] ·BII∗1 (12)
+ [n · (1− z) + (1− n) · (1− v)] ·BII1
Similar to (5) we can derive for the contribution of this subgroup in the second
period:
m·BII∗1 +n·BII1 =
⎡
⎣
m2 · z2 + ¡m · v + n2 · (1− v)¢ · z · (1−m)
+
∙ ¡
m · v + n2 · (1− v)¢ · (1− n)
+ (2 ·m · z + n · (1− z)) · n
¸
· (1− z)
⎤
⎦·B1 (13)
However, since this subgroup is "unproductive" in the third period we have:
m ·BIII∗1 + n ·BIII1 = 0 (14)
The change of output of this subgroup over time is obvious without a lengthy
explanation. In the first two decades, the behavior is equivalent to the α-group.
Since the output in the third decade is zero, it decreases over the complete lapse
of time.
As already mentioned, things are diﬀerent with the second subgroup. In-
dividuals in this group are unproductive in the first period. However, some of
them are insiders in this period. But since they are unsuccessful they can not
be distinguished from unsuccessful individuals of the α-type. Therefore, with
the beginning of the second period a share v of these persons become insiders.
The individuals can be subdivided into insiders and outsiders according to:
BII∗2 = B
I∗
2 = v ·B2 (15)
BII2 = B
I
2 = (1− v) ·B2 (16)
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The output of these individuals is now given by:
m ·BII∗2 + n ·BII2 = (m · v + n · (1− v)) ·B2 (17)
In the third period, the successful individuals of the subgroup stay inside the
system with a probability of z. The unsuccessful share is again able to stay in
the system with a probability of v. Consequently, we have:
BIII∗2 = (z ·m+ v · (1−m)) ·BII∗2 + (z · n+ v · (1− n)) ·BII2 (18)
= [(z ·m+ v · (1−m)) · v + (z · n+ v · (1− n)) · (1− v)] ·B2
BIII2 = ((1− z) ·m+ (1− v) · (1−m)) ·BII∗2 (19)
+((1− z) · n+ (1− v) · (1− n)) ·BII2
=
∙
((1− z) ·m+ (1− v) · (1−m)) · v
+((1− z) · n+ (1− v) · (1− n)) · (1− v)
¸
·B2
Consequently, the output is given by:
m ·BIII∗2 + n ·BIII2 =
∙
((1−m) · (1− v) +m · (1− z)) · v
+((1− n) · (1− v) + n · (1− z)) · (1− v)
¸
·B2 (20)
The output in the third decade is bigger than in the second decade as long
as:
0 < m ·BIII∗2 + n ·BIII2 −m ·BII∗2 − n ·BII2
= (m− n) · (m · v + n · (1− v)) · (z − v)
As expected, output of this subgroup increases as long as the probability to stay
inside the community is higher after a successful period. We can now compare
the output of this subgroup with the output of the α-type individuals. In the
second period, the output of the α-group is relatively higher if: m·A
II∗+n·AII
A >
(m · v + n · (1− v)). This can be reduced to:
(m− n) · (z − v) · (m · z + n · (1− z)) > 0
This inequality condition is fulfilled as long as m > n and z > v. In the third
decade, the comparison reveals a higher output of the α-group if:
0 < m ·AIII∗ + n ·AIII −m ·BIII∗2 − n ·BIII2
= (m− n)2 · (v − z)2 · (m · z + n · (1− z))
Again, the inequality condition is fulfilled. The output of the subgroup increases
from zero to a positive value in the second decade and increases thereafter if the
third decade approaches. But in all periods, the output per capita is below the
output of individuals of type α.
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2.3 "Once in a Lifetime" - Individuals Productive for Only
One Decade
Now what about the γ-type individuals? Similar to the β-individuals they start
either productive with a probability of z for being insiders or unproductive with
a probability of v being insiders. In later periods, productive individuals remain
insider with a probability of z but become nevertheless unproductive.
For the subgroup G1 consisting of individuals of type γ1 we have an output
similar to that of individuals of the α-group and the β1-subgroup. However, in
the second and third decades they are unproductive. It follows directly:
GI∗1 = z ·G1 (21)
GI1 = (1− z) ·G1 (22)
GII∗1 = (m · z + (1−m) · v) ·GI∗1 + (n · z + (1− n) · v) ·GI1 (23)
= [(m · z + (1−m) · v) · z + (n · z + (1− n) · v) · (1− z)] ·G1
GII1 = (m · (1− z) + (1−m) · (1− v)) ·GI∗1 (24)
+(n · (1− z) + (1− n) · (1− v)) ·GI1
=
∙
(m · (1− z) + (1−m) · (1− v)) · z
+(n · (1− z) + (1− n) · (1− v)) · (1− z)
¸
·G1
GIII∗1 = v ·G1 (25)
GIII1 = (1− v) ·G1 (26)
The output is given by:
m ·GI∗1 + n ·GI1 = (m · z + n · (1− z)) ·G1 (27)
m ·GII∗1 + n ·GII1 = 0 (28)
m ·GIII∗1 + n ·GIII1 = 0 (29)
Apparently, in the first decade the output of this subgroup is equivalent to
the output of subgroups A and B1. However, in the second and third periods
it drops to zero.
Subgroup G2 is unproductive in the first and third decades and highly pro-
ductive in the second decade. Consequently, we can write:
GI∗2 = v ·G2 (30)
GI2 = (1− v) ·G2 (31)
GII∗2 = v ·G2 (32)
GII2 = (1− v) ·G2 (33)
GIII∗2 = (m · z + (1−m) · v) ·GII∗1 + (n · z + (1− n) · v) ·GII1 (34)
= ((m · z + (1−m) · v) · v + (n · z + (1− n) · v) · (1− v)) ·G2
GIII2 = (m · (1− z) + (1−m) · (1− v)) ·GII∗2 (35)
+(n · (1− z) + (1− n) · (1− v)) ·GII2
=
∙
(m · (1− z) + (1−m) · (1− v)) · v
+(n · (1− z) + (1− n) · (1− v)) · (1− v)
¸
·G2
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The output of the subgroup is given by:
m ·GI∗2 + n ·GI2 = 0 (36)
m ·GII∗2 + n ·GII2 = (m · v + n · (1− v)) ·G2 (37)
m ·GIII∗2 + n ·GIII2 = 0 (38)
The change of output over time needs no further explanation. However, it
should be mentioned that resulting from the relation z > v the output is rela-
tively smaller than that of the subgroup G1 in the first decade despite an equal
productivity.
To complete the picture we have to look at subgroup G3, the group of late
bloomers. The individuals in this group are relatively unproductive in the first
and second decades and become productive in the last one. Therefore, we can
write:
GI∗3 = v ·G3 (39)
GI3 = (1− v) ·G3 (40)
GII∗3 = v ·G3 (41)
GII3 = (1− v) ·G3 (42)
GIII∗3 = v ·G3 (43)
GIII3 = (1− v) ·G3 (44)
Accordingly, we can find expressions for the output:
m ·GI∗3 + n ·GI3 = 0 (45)
m ·GII∗3 + n ·GII3 = 0 (46)
m ·GIII∗3 + n ·GIII3 = (m · v + n · (1− v)) ·G3 (47)
The output in the third decade is equal to the output of subgroup G2 in the
second decade.
3 "All Together Now" - The Complete Economy
We can now merge all components to get a model of the complete economy. Let
y be the output per capita. It follows for the average individual:
y =
1
N
·
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
¡
yIA + y
II
A + y
III
A
¢ ·A
+
¡
yIB1 + y
II
B1 + y
III
B1
¢ ·B1 + ¡yIB2 + yIIB2 + yIIIB2 ¢ ·B2
+
¡
yIG1 + y
II
G1 + y
III
G1
¢ ·G1 + ¡yIG2 + yIIG2 + yIIIG2 ¢ ·G2
+
¡
yIG3 + y
II
G3 + y
III
G3
¢ ·G3
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (48)
To simplify the notation we use yIX + y
II
X + y
III
X = yX for the total output of
a subgroup and X(•)
N
= x(•) for the weight of a subgroup as share in the total
population.12 Furthermore, Y I denotes the output of the young generation,
12Note that without population growth we can skip the time indices.
12
Y II the output of the middle-aged generation and Y III the output of the old
generation. This results in:
y = yA · a+ yB1 · b1 + yB2 · b2 + yG1 · g1 + yG2 · g2 + yG3 · g3
The average output per head decreases over the life span if Y I > Y II > Y III :
yIA · a+ yIB1 · b1 + yIB2 · b2 + yIG1 · g1 + yIG2 · g2 + yIG3 · g3 (49)
≥ yIIA · a+ yIIB1 · b1 + yIIB2 · b2 + yIIG1 · g1 + yIIG2 · g2 + yIIG3 · g3
≥ yIIIA · a+ yIIIB1 · b1 + yIIIB2 · b2 + yIIIG1 · g1 + yIIIG2 · g2 + yIIIG3 · g3
Using the results of the previous section allows us to simplify this expression:
yIB2 = y
III
B1 = y
I
G2 = y
I
G3 = y
II
G1 = y
II
G3 = y
III
G1 = y
III
G2 = 0
yIA = y
I
B1 = y
I
G1
yIIA = y
II
B1
yIIB2 = y
II
G2
yIG1 > y
II
G2 = y
III
G3
We can simplify Condition (49) and write:
yIA · (a+ b1 + g1) (50)
≥ yIIA · (a+ b1) + yIIB2 · (b2 + g2)
≥ yIIIA · a+ yIIIB2 · b2 + yIIB2 · g3
The behavior of the system depends on the parameter values. As we did in
Section 2.1 we can calculate the derivatives of the diﬀerences with respect to
the parameters m, n, v and z and evaluate the resulting expressions at the point
m = z = 1.13 The probability of success of "insiders" has no clear-cut eﬀect on
the change of productivity.
∂
¡
Y I − Y II
¢
∂m
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=z=1
= g1 − (a+ b1) · (1− n) · (1− v)− (b2 + g2) · v
If the subgroup of individuals of type γ1 is rather large, a decrease of the prob-
ability of success of insiders m results in a smaller gap in the productivity of
per capita output of individuals in the first and second decades of their working
life. If this subgroup is small enough, a decreasing m results in a widening of
the gap.
∂
¡
Y I − Y II
¢
∂n
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=z=1
= − (b2 + g2) · (1− v) ≤ 0
∂
¡
Y I − Y II
¢
∂v
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=z=1
= − (b2 + g2) · (1− n) ≤ 0
13 See Appendix for the derivatives.
13
The eﬀects of a change of the probability of success for individiduals outside
the community and of a change of the probability of unsuccessful insiders to
stay inside the community are very similar: Both eﬀects result in a smaller gap
between the productivities of individuals in their first and second decades of
their working life. The probability of successful individuals being insiders in the
following period is also not unambiguous.
∂
¡
Y I − Y II
¢
∂z
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=z=1
= (a+ b1 + g1) · (1− n)
− (a+ b1) ·
¡
2− n2 · (v − 1)− v + n · (2 · v − 3)¢
If we look at the change of productivity at the boundary of the second and third
decades of working life the derivatives are even more complicated to interpret:
∂
¡
Y II − Y III
¢
∂m
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=z=1
= −b2 · ((v − 1) · (n · (2 · v − 1)− 2 · v))
+ (a+ b1) · (2 + n · (v − 1)− v) + v · (g2 − g3)
−a ·
µ
3 · (1− v) + n2 · (v − 1) 2 + v2
+n · ¡5 · v − 2 · v2 − 3¢
¶
∂
¡
Y II − Y III
¢
∂n
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=z=1
= (1− v) ·
µ
(b2 + g2)− b2 · (n · (v − 1)− v)
− (g3 + b2 · (2− n− (1− n) · v))
¶
∂
¡
Y II − Y III
¢
∂v
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=z=1
= (1− n) ·
µ
(b2 + g2)− b2 · (n · (v − 1)− v)
− (g3 + b2 · (2− n− (1− n) · v))
¶
∂
¡
Y II − Y III
¢
∂z
¯¯¯¯
¯
m=z=1
= b2 · (1− n) · (n · (v − 1)− v)
+ (a+ b1) ·
¡
2− n2 · (v − 1)− v + n · (2 · v − 3)¢
−a ·
µ
(v − 1) · ¡n2 · (3 · v − 4)− n3 · (v − 1)− 3¢
+n · ¡8 · v − 3 · v2 − 6¢+ v2
¶
To get an idea about the likely behavior of the system we have to make
an assumption about the pattern of distribution of individuals. It seems to be
plausible that we have more individuals of the γ -type than of type β and more
of type β than of the most productive α-individuals. Consequently, we want to
assume that:14
N (α) = N (β1) = N (β2) = N (γ1) = N (γ2) = N (γ3)
Starting with an extreme scenario with m = z = 1 and n = v = 0, the dif-
ferences are positive
¡
Y I − Y II = Y II − Y III > 0
¢
. However, the derivatives
14This assumption implies N
6
individuals being of type α, N
3
of type β and N
2
of type γ.
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have diﬀerent signs. Whereas a decrease of all variables increases the gap be-
tween the productivities per capita of the first and second decades, a decrease
of m and n make this gap smaller but a decrease of v and z enlarges this gap.
The same results can be found for m = z = 1 and n = v = 0.1. In the
more likely case m = z = 0.9 and n = v = 0.1 the diﬀerences are positive¡
Y I − Y II = Y II − Y III > 0
¢
. Here, the derivatives with respect to m and z
are positive and the derivatives with respect to n and v negative. An increase
in the probabilities of success for insiders and unchanged status for successful
individuals widens the gap, whereas an increase of the probabilities of success
for outsiders and of unsuccessful individuals becoming insiders scale down the
gap. If m and z become smaller, the diﬀerence between productivity in the
first and second decades decreases and eventually turns out to be negative.15
Additionally, the derivatives for the second diﬀerence with respect to n and
v are positive, indicating an increasing gap with increasing probabilities com-
pared to the second and third decades. Another extreme scenario is the perfect
randomization of success and status-keeping between groups characterized by
m = n = v = z = 0.5. In this case, productivity in the first decade is smaller
than in the second decade, but in the second higher than in the third. This
corresponds to the result for the case without uncertainty about status and suc-
cess discussed above. The derivatives indicate that a change of v and z has no
influence on productivity at all. However, a decrease of m and n increases the
gap between the productivities in the first and second decades but decreases
this gap between productivities in the second and third decades. Parameter
values with m < n and v > z seem to be implausible. However, if we calculate
the resulting derivatives we find a decreasing eﬀect of increasing values of m
and n and an increasing eﬀect of increasing values of v and z for the first two
periods. With respect to the second and third decades the eﬀect of increasing
values of m and n is positive but of v and z negative.16 The diﬀerence between
productivities depends on the parameter values; for the first two periods it can
be positive or negative whereas for the last two periods it is a positive diﬀerence
indicating a decrease in productivity.
4 Summary
In the literature, there is a great deal of discussion about the interaction be-
tween age and productivity. Especially the question of age discrimination is
still unsolved. Empirical observations lead to the conclusion that productivity
can decrease with age due to diminishing physical capabilities and decreasing
flexibility that hinders the adaptation to new or changed requirements in one’s
own area of work. Contrary to these findings the increase of social competence
and longtime working experience can result in increasing productivity.
The aim of the present paper is to explain an apparant lower productivity of
15As an example we can calculate the values for m = z = 0.7 and n = v = 0.25.
16As an example we used the values m = z = 0.25 and n = v = 0.75.as well as m = z = 0.2
and n = v = 0.8.
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older worker with a selection process inside the world of work. In a model with
diﬀerent types of workers we introduce uncertainty about the working conditions
in the following decade depending on the success in the present period. Indi-
viduals with high productivity have a higher probability to enjoy good working
conditions in the following period than individuals with low productivity today.
For reasonable parameter values we can observe mainly patterns that allow to
explain a decreasing productivity of individuals over the life cycle despite an a
priori productivity that would result in a peak of productivity in the middle of
lifetime. Consequently, the emprical research discussed above should be recon-
sidered with a special attention to the inherent selection mechanisms that give
older individuals a hard time in their eﬀort to be as productive as their younger
colleagues.
Several expansions of the model are imaginable. Let us assume that produc-
tivity depends on the worker’s eﬀort. Hence, incentives play a role in explaining
this eﬀort. A temporally unrestricted employment lowers the incentives to be
productive, whereas annually renowed contracts create higher incentives. How-
ever, if payment is low and work demanding, restricted contracts decrease the
incentives for a high-productive individual to enter the scientific community at
all. Additionally, this eﬀort is lower if the time the individual will stay inside the
scientific community becomes shorter since the return on investments in specific
human capital decreases. But this is left for future research.
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5 Appendix
The output per capita derived in Section 2 can be expressed in the following
way:
yIA = m · z + n · (1− z)
yIIA =
⎡
⎣
m2 · z2 + ¡m · v + n2 · (1− v)¢ · z · (1−m)
+
∙ ¡
m · v + n2 · (1− v)¢ · (1− n)
+ (2 ·m · z + n · (1− z)) · n
¸
· (1− z)
⎤
⎦
yIIIA =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−n3 · (v − z)2 · (z − 1)
+m ·
µ
m2 · z3 +m · v2 · (m · z − 1)
+v · ¡m · z − 2 ·m2 · z2 + 1¢
¶
+n2 · (v − z) ·
µ
m · z · (2− 3 · z)
+v · (m · (3 · z − 2)− 1) + 1
¶
+n ·
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 +m · z +m · v2 · (m− 3 ·m · z + 2)
+m2 · ¡z2 − 3 · z3¢
+v ·
µ
2 ·m2 · z · (3 · z − 1)
−m · (2 · z + 1)− 1
¶
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
yIIB2 = m · v + n · (1− v)
yIIIB2 =
∙
((1−m) · (1− v) +m · (1− z)) · v
+((1− n) · (1− v) + n · (1− z)) · (1− v)
¸
The output of the generations is now:
Y I = (m · z + n · (1− z)) · (a+ b1 + g1)
Y II =
µ
n2 · (v − z) · (1− z) +m · (v +m · z · (z − v))
+n · (1 +m · z · (1− 2 · z) + v · (2 ·m · z −m− 1))
¶
· (a+ b1)
+ (m · v + n · (1− v)) · (b2 + g2)
Y III = (m · v + n · (1− v)) · (g3 + b2 · (1 + (m− n) · (z − v)))
+a ·
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
n3 · (v − z) 2 · (1− z)
+n2 · (v − z) ·
µ
1 +m · z · (2− 3 · z)
+v · (m · (3 · z − 2)− 1)
¶
+n ·
⎛
⎝
1 +m · z +m · v2 · (2 +m− 3 ·m · z)
+m2 · ¡z2 − 3 · z3¢
+v · ¡2 ·m2 · z · (3 · z − 1)−m · (2 · z + 1)− 1¢
⎞
⎠
+m ·
µ
m2 · z3 +m · v2 · (m · z − 1)
+v · ¡1 +m · z − 2 ·m2 · z2¢
¶
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
The average output per capita decreases over lifetime if the following diﬀerences
are positive:
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Y I − Y II = (a+ b1 + g1) · (m · z + n · (1− z))
− (b2 + g2) · (m · v + n · (1− v))
− (a+ b1) ·
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
n2 · (v − z) · (1− z)
+m · (v +m · z · (z − v))
+n ·
µ
1 +m · z · (1− 2 · z)
+v · (2 ·m · z −m− 1)
¶
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
Y II − Y III = (b2 + g2) · (m · v + n · (1− v))
+ (n · (v − 1)−m · v) · (g3 + b2 · (1 + (m− n) · (z − v)))
+ (a+ b1) ·
µ
−n2 · (v − z) · (z − 1) +m · (v +m · z · (z − v))
+n · (m · ((1− 2 · z) · (z − v))− v + 1)
¶
−a ·
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
m ·
µ
m2 · z3 +m · v2 · (m · z − 1)
+v · ¡1 +m · z − 2 ·m2 · z2¢
¶
−n3 · (v − z)2 · (z − 1)
+n2 · (v − z) ·
µ
1 +m · z · (2− 3 · z)
+v · (m · (3 · z − 2)− 1)
¶
+n ·
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
m ·
µ
m · ¡z2 − 3 · z3¢+ z
+v2 · (2 +m− 3 ·m · z)
¶
+v ·
µ
2 ·m2 · z · (3 · z − 1)
−m · (1 + 2 · z)− 1
¶
+ 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Y I − Y III = (a+ b1 + g1) · (m · v + n · (1− v))
+ (n · (v − 1)−m · v) · (g3 + b2 · (1 + (m− n) · (z − v)))
−a ·
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
m ·
µ
m2 · z3 +m · v2 · (m · z − 1)
+v · ¡1 +m · z − 2 ·m2 · z2¢
¶
−n3 · (v − z)2 · (z − 1)
+n2 · (v − z) ·
µ
1 +m · z · (2− 3 · z)
+v · (m · (3 · z − 2)− 1)
¶
+n ·
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
m2 · ¡z2 − 3 · z3¢+m · z
+m · v2 · (2 +m− 3 ·m · z)
+v ·
µ
2 ·m2 · z · (3 · z − 1)
−m · (1 + 2 · z)− 1
¶
+ 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Now we can calculate the derivatives of the diﬀerences with respect to the
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parameters m, n, v and z.
∂
¡
Y I − Y II
¢
∂m
= − (b2 + g2) · v + (a+ b1 + g1) · z
− (a+ b1) ·
µ
z · n+ v · (1− n)
+2 · z · (z − v) · (m− n)
¶
∂
¡
Y I − Y II
¢
∂n
= (b2 + g2) · (v − 1)− (a+ b1 + g1) · (z − 1)
− (a+ b1) ·
µ
2 · (v − z) · (z · (m− n) + n)
+m · z · (1− v)− v + 1
¶
∂
¡
Y I − Y II
¢
∂v
= − (m− n) · ((a+ b1) · (1− (m− n) · z − n) + b2 + g2)
∂
¡
Y I − Y II
¢
∂z
= (m− n) · (g1 + (a+ b1) · (1 + (m− n) · (v − 2 · z)− n))
∂
¡
Y II − Y III
¢
∂m
= (g2 − g3) · v − b2 · (z − v) · (2 · v · (m− n) + n)
+ (a+ b1) · ((z − v) · (2 · z · (m− n) + n) + v)
−a ·
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(m− n) ·
µ
v2 ·
µ
3 · z · (m− n)
+2 · (n− 1)
¶
+ 2 · v · z
¶
+
µ ¡
m2 + n2
¢ · z2 · 3
−2 · z · ¡n2 +m · n · (3 · z − 1)¢
¶
· (z − 2 · v)
+ (1− n) · v + n · z
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
∂
¡
Y II − Y III
¢
∂n
= b2 · ((2 · v · (m− n) + 2 · n−m) · (z − v)) + (v − 1) · (g3 − g2)
+ (a+ b1) ·
µ
1− 2 · n · (v − z) · (z − 1)
+m · (z · (1 + 2 · (v − z))− v)− v
¶
−a ·
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
¡
2 · n ·m · (3 · z − 2) + 3 · n2 · (1− z)¢ · (v − z) 2
+m · v2 · (2 +m− 3 ·m · z) +m2 · z2 · (1− 3 · z)
+v · ¡2 ·m2 · z · (3 · z − 1)−m · (1 + 2 · z)− 1¢
+(v − z) · (2 · n− v) +m · z + 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
∂
¡
Y II − Y III
¢
∂v
= (m− n) ·
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
g2 − g3 + b1 · (1 + n · (z − 1)−m · z)
+b2 · (n+ (2 · v − z) · (m− n))
+2 · a ·
µ
((2 · z − 1) ·m+ n− 1) · n
+m−
¡
m2 + n2
¢ · z
¶
· (v − z)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
∂
¡
Y II − Y III
¢
∂z
= (m− n) · (b1 − b2) · n
−
⎛
⎝
(b1 + b2) · v − 2 · b1 · z
+a · (v − z) ·
µ
2 · (1− n)
+ (m− n) · (v − 3 · z)
¶ ⎞⎠ · (m− n) 2
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